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of the station such as to indicate an actual
agency relationship. 279 Md. at 643, 370
A.2d at 560. See Keitz v. National Paving
Co., 214 Md. 479, 134 A.2d 296 (1957).
The law of agency by estoppel is expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§267 (1958) as follows:
One who represents that another is his
servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is
subject to liability to the third person
for harm caused by the lack of care or
skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
This reliance must be actual and on the
part of the person injured. It is not sufficient that third parties direct the injured
based on their faith in the apparent agency. 279 Md. at 644, 370 A.2d at 561.
In order for Mabe to recover, the record
must show such reliance on his part:
reliance on the skill of the apparent agent.
It was insufficient to show attraction to
the station merely because it offered British Petroleum products. 279 Md. at 647,
370 A.2d at 562.
After its examination of the record, the
court concluded that such reliance on
Mabe's part was lacking; he entered this
station rather than others in the proximate area because it provided B.P. products. In its interpretation of the record,
the court cited a number of cases which
held that the presence of an oil company's
insignia was insufficient to establish the
agency relationship (Levine v. Standard
Oil Co., 249 Miss. 651, 163 So.2d 750
(1964) and that the corporation's representations were limited to showing the
presence of its products. See Sherman v.
Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d
916 (1960).
In reversing the Court of Special Appeals and denying recovery, the court
found Mabe's attraction to the station to
constitute no more than choice of products. 279 Md. at 649, 370 A.2d at 564.
Judge Levine dissented vigorously. He
noted that the court of Special Appeals
sitting en bane had found the other way
with only one dissent. The implication
was that the solution of the case turned on
an interpretation of the record, and that
the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to Mabe was sufficient to support the jury verdict. Mabe had stated at
trial that he not only bought B.P. products, but that he always dealt with B.P.
It is apparent that this case is solved by
a point over which reasonable men differ,
and that there is considerable justification
for a new trial. Instead, we are left with a
narrow view of vicarious liability in this
area, with limits of responsibility closely
drawn and tightly circumscribed.

Trounced For
An Ounce
by John Jeffrey Ross
Noting that the Eighth Amendment has
generally been invoked to proscribe "barbarous methods of punishment," a federal
judge recently called upon the flexible
and dynamic nature of the Constitution to
grant a petition for habeas corpus relief
from two consecutive 20-year sentences.
Davis v. Zahradniek, 432 F. Supp. 444
(W.O. Va. 1977).
Petitioner Davis had been incarcerated
after convictions in a Virginia court for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for its actual distribution. The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the
convictions and the sentences and Davis
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in
the United States District Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2254. In addition to his
Eighth Amendment claims, Davis contended: that he was denied a trial by an

impartial jury; that he was subjected to an
illegal search and seizure; that the
government failed to prove possession of
marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the state failed to show that the
substance involved was illegal contraband
under the Virginia statute. 432 F.Supp. at
446-447.
The District Court rejected any arguments alleging error in the conduct of the
trial, and the case turned solely on the
Eighth Amendment claim that the 20year sentence (plus a $20,000 fine) was
constitutionally offensive in light of the
nature of the offense.
After considering whether the length of
a sentence can serve as a basis for "habeas
relief," the court indicated that the disproportionality of the sentence in relationship to the offense constitutes excessiveness which is the "hallmark of
cruel and unusual punishment." 432
F.Supp. at 450.
In granting the petition, the court considered four elements in its constitutional
examination of the sentence. First considered was the nature of the offense. The
fact that the amount of marijuana was less
than nine ounces and the absence of any
aspect of violence in the offense were crucial to the disposition of this petition.
Regarding the second factor, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, it
was eminently clear to the court that the
legislative frustration of the sale of a questionably harmful drug could be served by
a less severe punishment.
Third, after an examination of punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions, the court noted the relative excessiveness of the Virginia sentence.
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service stations. The only restriction is
that company employees may not operate
the service stations.
Equal protection of the laws is not

Finally, the comparison was made between maximum sentences in Virginia for
other offenses and the marijuana offense.
Examples of other crimes drawing a 20-

discretion to allow company operation of
service stations, and extensions of the
time limits of the act upon a showing of

year sentence in Virginia were second

Exxon Corporation brought an action

denied where a classification is not purely

degree murder, malicious shooting with
intent to maim, and attempted murder.

in the circuit court for Anne Arundel
County challenging the validity of the leg-

arbitrary and has a rational basis. Here the
classification is based on diligent research
on the part of the Comptroller's office and

cause.

The court thus concluded that the sen-

islation and asking that its enforcement be

tences effected exceptional hardships on

enjoined. Exxon soon was joined by other

the results of three hearings held as the

the defendant and constituted an im-

oil companies. The companies argued that
the act denied them due process of law,

act was being considered for passage. It

unduly burdened interstate commerce,

irrational.
The delegation of power to the Comp-

proprietous application of the law to the
offenses so as to offend the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Ban On
Company
Operated Gas
Stations
Upheld
by Robert C. Becker

Events surrounding the oil embargo of
1973 should be fresh in memory. Great
inconvenience to petroleum consumers
and much misinformation and rumor surrounding fuel shortages prompted the
State Comptroller's office to propose and
the General Assembly to pass, legislation
regulating the operation of retail service
stations. (Chapter 854 of the Laws of
Maryland of 1974 amended by Chapter
608 of the Laws of 1975; Maryland Code
Annotated, Article 56 §157E).
After July 1, 1977, no producer or
refiner of petroleum products may open a
retail service station to be operated by
company employees, nor, after July 1,
1978, may such producer or refiner continue to operate a retail service station by
use of company employees; the stations
must be operated by independent service
station managers. Producers, refiners and
wholesalers of petroleum products must
extend voluntary allowances uniformly
and equitably to the retail service stations
they supply. The Comptroller will have
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constituted a taking of property without
compensation, denied them equal protec-

cannot be said to be purely arbitrary and

troller is a reasonable one under the cir-

tion of the laws, was an unlawful delega-

cumstances. It would be impossible for

tion of legislative authority, conflicted
with federal legislation and was void for

the legislature to antiCipate in detail the
possible needs for modification of the

vagueness. The circuit court agreed with

terms of the act.

the companies and granted the relief

This act does not conflict with the

sought. The State appealed this decision,

Robinson-Patman Act as charged, for the

and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.

Maryland statute would, in the future, be

Writing for the court, in Gov. of the
State of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md.
410, 370 A.2d 1102, Judge Eldridge
answered the arguments of the companies
point by point. The act does not deny due
process of law because it is arguably of
such benefit to the people of Maryland as
to make it a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power. It does not unduly
burden interstate commerce because it
regulates an activity which occurs entirely
intrastate, and it is not so written as to
protect a domestic industry by discriminating against products in interstate
commerce.
The argument that the act is an unconstitutional taking of property without
compensation fails because there is in fact
no taking of property at all. The oil companies keep posseSSion of their service
stations and their right to use them as

laws address different problems. The
held invalid only to the extent that it actually conflicted with federal legislation.
No such conflict is found here.
The statute is not void for vagueness
because the terms held to be vague are
terms of trade within the regulated industry. Members of that industry may reasonably be held to understand their own vernacular.
Reaction to this decision has been
strong, and appeals have been made to
the United States Supreme Court by
Exxon Corporation, Shell Oil Company
and Continental Oil Company (docket
numbers 77-10, 77-11, and 77-12
respectively). The decision is most notable for its impact on the Corporation's
control over their distribution of
petroleum goods and services. In the balance is the future of the petroleum industry as a wholly integrated enterprise.

